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Abstract
In the past decade there has been a notable shift in South African education policy that 
raises the value of school leadership as a lever for learning improvements. Despite a 
growing discourse on school leadership, there has been a lack of empirical based evidence 
on principals to inform, validate or debate the efficacy of proposed policies in raising the 
calibre of school principals. Drawing on findings from a larger study to understand the 
labour market for school principals in South Africa, this paper highlights four overarching 
characteristics of this market with implications for informing principal policy reforms. 
The paper notes that improving the design and implementation of policies guiding the 
appointment process for principals is a matter of urgency. A substantial and increasing 
number of principal replacements are taking place across South African schools given the 
rising age profile of school principals. In a context of low levels of principal mobility and 
high tenure, the leadership trajectory of the average school is established for nearly a 
decade with each principal replacement. Evidence-based policy making has a strong role 
to play in getting this right.
Keywords: School principals, principal turnover, mobility, attrition, principal appoint-
ments, competency-based testing, performance management systems
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Introduction
Despite both anecdotal evidence that school principals matter for learning and 
convincing international quantitative evidence that supports this notion, often too 
little policy attention is given to harnessing the benefits of school leadership for 
educational improvements. In reference to Chile, José Weinstein and colleagues sum up 
the problem well, noting that “[p]rincipals form part of a strategic sector that has not 
been duly explored in its potential for contributing to education progress” (Weinstein, 
Munoz & Raczynski 2011:298). In South Africa, however, there have been notable shifts 
in the past decade that raise the value of school leadership and management as critical 
levers for learning gains and in increasing levels of accountability within the education 
system. This has been expressed in amendments to legislation, statements and actions 
of the Department of Basic Education (DBE) and in national policy plans.
In particular, with the release of the National Development Plan (NDP) in 2012, the 
need to strengthen the policy framework governing principals has arguably gained 
traction as it explicitly identifies the importance of strengthening school leadership as a 
national priority (NPC 2012:309-310). The NDP proposes policy improvements for school 
principals in three broad areas: the principal appointment process, managing their 
performance and providing them with greater powers over school management (ibid).
Concurrently, quantitative research has not kept abreast with needed policy 
improvements governing school principals. There is a lack of empirical evidence in the 
local context to guide and support policy implementation in this area; this is particularly 
problematic when politically interested groups are likely to have convincing arguments 
against proposed reforms. This paper summarises evidence from a larger body of 
research by the author on the labour market for school principals in South Africa to 
contribute to the wider discourse on school leadership in South Africa (Wills 2015a). 
Four overarching quantitative characteristics of this market are highlighted to inform, 
support and debate recent policy developments involving school principals. In light 
of these findings, the NDP policy proposals to raise the calibre of school leadership 
are considered and additional policy recommendations are proposed. The intention is 
to identify the seeds of a better future system of policies while considering current 
provisions already made to improve school leadership.
International evidence on principal effectiveness
For years, a large education administration literature located primarily in the United 
States of America (USA) and Europe has purported that school leaders are critical to 
school effectiveness and student learning. For example, Leithwood, Louis, Anderson and 
Wahlstrom (2004) in their review of case studies noted that principals are only second to 
teachers in terms of their importance for student learning and school effectiveness in 
general. In this literature, much of the anecdotal evidence elucidating the importance of 
principals has unfortunately been dampened by quantitative analyses noting very small 
effects of leadership on school outcomes (Witziers, Bosker & Kruger 2003). These small 
effects are attributed to the non-representative samples used in analyses, inadequate 
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quantitative methodologies adopted and narrow frameworks used in measuring 
leadership (Hallinger & Heck 1996; Robinson, Lloyd & Rowe 2008).
In the economics literature, a new and emerging evidence-base using large scale 
data sets and value-added models provide convincing evidence that school principals 
matter considerably for student learning (Branch, Hanushek & Rivkin 2012; Chiang, 
Lipscomb & Gill 2012; Coelli & Green 2012; Grissom, Kalogrides & Loeb 2012). Value-
added models identify the additional value that principals bring to student learning 
after isolating out the contributions of individual teachers, the school and also the 
ability and backgrounds of individual students. Widely cited research by Branch et al 
(2012) using data on schools in Texas, suggests that highly effective principals can raise 
the achievement of the average student in their schools by between two and seven 
months of learning in a school year; ineffective principals lower achievement by the 
same amount. These are educationally significant effects, second only to the direct 
effects of individual teacher quality on student learning. But the difference between 
teachers and principals is that principals affect all students in a school rather than just 
the students a single teacher instructs. The overall impact from increasing principal 
quality therefore substantially exceeds the benefit from a comparable increase in the 
quality of a single teacher (Branch, Hanushek & Rivkin 2013). The obvious implication 
of this international evidence is that the effective placement and distribution of 
principals across schools really matters for school effectiveness and student learning 
(Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor & Wheeler 2007; Loeb, Kalogrides & Horng 2010). Policy has 
an important role to play in ensuring that principals are distributed as equitably as 
possible across the school system, ensuring that the right principals are appointed and 
in raising the performance of existing leadership.
Background on policies influencing school leadership in the 
local context
Beyond anecdotal evidence or findings from small case studies of schools, there is 
little to no research that has provided any systematic quantitative evidence linking 
school principals or their competencies to school performance in the South African 
context.1 Hoadley and Ward (2009) in their review of literature on school management 
and leadership reiterate earlier remarks by Bush, Glover, Bischoff et al (2006) that our 
understanding is limited in terms of how the actions and behaviours of school leaders 
in South Africa are contributing to or detracting from school functionality, particularly 
with respect to producing learning outcomes. One reason for this is that reliable 
1 The little we know about the practices of school leaders and managers and how their actions 
influence learning has been informed through a few case studies of schools, particularly 
exceptional schools that have achieved excellent academic results despite facing various school 
constraints. Christie, Butler and Potterton (2007) for example conducted case studies of 18 schools 
that achieved good to excellent results in the matric certificate. Their research concluded that 
effective leadership was a critical success factor explaining student achievement across these 
schools. There is also some suggestive evidence of the importance of school management more 
broadly for learning in schools (Taylor 2011; Taylor, Gamble, Spies & Garisch 2012.)
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quantitative research is hampered by the lack of representative data linking teachers 
and principals to students over time. 
In the policy environment, however, there have been some interesting 
developments during the past decade. With promulgation of the Education Laws 
Amendment Act in 2007, more accountability for school performance was placed in the 
hands of principals as legislation required of them to plan for academic improvements 
in schools and report progress against school plans (RSA 2007). A recent example 
of how this legislation is used at a provincial level to improve accountability is a 
gazette released by the Western Cape Government Department that imposes 
binding performance indicators on schools, holding principals responsible for setting 
performance targets and implementing plans to achieve these targets (PGWC 2015). 
However, policies of this nature may not produce the kind of behavioural changes 
required for school improvement. There is considerable evidence that the majority 
of principals are complying and that they are developing improvement plans and 
performance reports in line with legislation (Taylor 2014). An analysis of the School 
Monitoring Survey of 2011 indicates that as many as 85% of schools had school 
improvement plans, 78% had academic improvement plans and a further 94% had 
academic performance reports (RSA DBE 2014a:24). Whether these documents are 
actually meaningful, of good quality and implemented to improve learning outcomes 
is another question. Accountability mechanisms must have clear links to school 
improvement rather than merely imposing another compliance burden on the system 
(Pritchett 2013; Taylor 2014). This should be a key consideration in the design and 
implementation of performance management systems affecting principals’ work.
For the most part, principals’ performance is still assessed in terms of the 
Integrated Quality Management System (IQMS) agreed to in 2003 (ELRC 2003). This 
system has a number of weaknesses in terms of both its design and implementation, 
which impedes its ability to introduce the levels of accountability initially intended. 
It has not provided sufficiently clear standards against which to assess the work of 
principals (Smit 2013). Attaining good ratings has been too easy (RSA DBE 2012:22). 
Moreover, many principals have often not been evaluated by their immediate 
supervisors (circuit managers) as initially proposed by the agreement: in the sample of 
schools visited by IQMS moderators in 2011/12 only 41% of principals had been evaluated 
by their circuit manager (RSA DBE 2012:44).
Finally, the ‘carrots and sticks’ of IQMS are arguably ineffective in inducing changes 
in behaviour. In particular, its capacity to introduce notable threats to job security is 
stifled in the face of stringent labour legislation and substantial union involvement 
which create significant barriers to dismissals. Van Onselen (2012) indicated that 
between 2000 and 2011 a total of ninety-seven educators were permanently struck 
off the register of the South African Council of Educators – an average of less than 
ten a year. However, estimations based on 2011 termination data from the DBE 
point to a much larger number of dismissals – roughly 350 per year across provincial 
departments. As a proportion of educators this is arguably still low at about one in 
1 000 educators although this ratio varies across provincial departments. Using the 
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same data, roughly twenty-two principals were dismissed in 2011, less than one in a 
1 000 principals in South Africa. As a point of comparison, in the USA for example, 
roughly twenty-one in 1 000 teachers are dismissed annually for poor performance 
(Aritomi, Coopersmith & Gruber 2009). 
The national DBE has made a number of statements pertaining to holding principals 
accountable for school performance through the introduction of new performance 
contracts (Khumalo 2011; Phakathi 2012). A draft performance agreement for principals 
was proposed by the DBE in June 2011 that would hold principals accountable for the 
performance of teachers and also student test results. Unfortunately, as explained 
in a succinct description by Louise Smit (2013) of these Educational Labour Relations 
Council (ELRC) negotiations during the past ten years, introducing more effective 
performance management for principals has been resisted by teacher unions, and the 
June 2011 proposal was withdrawn in 2012 (ibid). 
In the context of weak existing accountability systems for school principals, the 
NDP reiterated the need for introducing performance contracts for principals and 
deputy principals aimed at improving their performance and targeting their training 
needs. It also advocated replacing underperforming principals; a proposal supported 
by current legislation. The Education Amendment Act of 2007 makes provision 
for tackling poor leadership in poorly performing schools through i) identifying 
underperforming schools, and ii) taking action to either counsel the principals of 
these underperforming schools or to appoint academic mentors to take over their 
functions and responsibilities for a period of time as determined by provincial Head 
of Departments (RSA 2007). In addition, the Employment of Educators Act makes 
provision for the dismissal, after an inquiry, of an educator who is unfit for the duties 
attached to his or her post. However, there are variations in the extent to which this is 
legislation is implemented. For example, in the Western Cape, an educator is six times 
as likely to be dismissed compared to an educator in Limpopo. 
Importantly, the NDP also stresses the importance of making the right principal 
appointment at the outset. Nationally, appointment processes and short-listing 
criteria governing teacher and principal appointments are expressed in the Personnel 
Administrative Measures (RSA DoE 2003). After short-listing applicants who meet 
minimum appointment criteria, interviews are conducted at schools by a panel 
consisting of parents, the principal, a department representative (who may be the 
principal) and a union representative whose role is only to ‘observe’ that due process 
is followed. The panel then submits recommendations of their choice of candidate to 
the head of department who makes the final appointment decision (ibid:21). In recent 
years, various reports have highlighted the undue influence of unions in selection 
processes beyond mere observation. There have also been allegations of bribery, 
cronyism and concerns that School Government Bodies (SGBs) do not possess the 
necessary capacities to interview and select the right person for the job (Taylor 2014; 
NPC 2012; City Press 2014). In improving the appointment process for principals, the 
NDP recommends reducing the undue influence of unions in the appointment process 
while providing increased support to SGBs to fulfil their general mandate.
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It also suggests raising entry level requirements for principals where a prerequisite 
for principal promotion should be an Advanced Certificate in Education (ACE) in 
School Management and Leadership. As expressed in the Personnel Administrative 
Measures, observed credentials including qualifications and years of experience are 
the key criteria guiding principal appointments (RSA DoE 2003). However, these 
criteria do not substantially differ from that of an entry level teacher. In addition to 
raising the minimum entry level criteria for principal appointments, the NDP proposes 
augmenting the appointment process with competency-based assessments for 
principal applicants to determine their suitability and identify the areas in which they 
would need development and support. This in turn will limit the undue influence of 
unions and other interested parties in the appointment process, especially where an 
independent contractor manages this process.
These NDP proposals are the latest in a number of attempts to raise the calibre of 
school leadership. For example, raising minimum criteria for entry into principal positions 
was considered as early as 2007 through the initial introduction of the ACE programme in 
School Management and Leadership and its later review and redesign (Bush et al. 2009; 
NPC 2012). More recently, the DBE has set in motion a series of additional actions 
towards implementing policies in line with the NDP recommendations. In August 
2014, a national gazette of a draft policy stipulating the Standard for Principalship was 
released for public comment (RSA DBE 2014b). The document outlined the qualities and 
competencies school leaders should have. As noted by Christie (2010), the setting of 
‘professional standards’ for principals forms part of the broader drive for accountability. 
These standards are likely to form the framework on which competency tests and any 
forthcoming improved performance management systems for principals will be based. 
Moreover, provincial education departments in the Western Cape and Gauteng have 
already embarked on a process of piloting competency tests in the principal appointment 
process (RSA 2015). The DBE’s commitment to this goal was also expressed in their 2015 
Annual Performance Plan where the number of new principal appointments involving 
competency-testing was introduced as a key performance indicator in tracking the 
attainment of the DBE goals expressed in their Action Plan 2019: Towards Schooling 2030 
(RSA DBE 2015a; RSA DBE 2015b). 
Despite the steps taken to accelerate policy developments for increased principal 
accountability, progress toward implementing these goals has been slow, particularly 
with regards to improving the principal appointment process. As presented in the 
next discussion, a substantial number of new principals have been appointed in recent 
years, but for the most part this has occurred in the absence of new legislated policies 
governing their appointment.
Data
The empirical results summarised in this paper have been drawn from an analysis of a 
panel data set of schools and their principals, constructed by matching South African 
payroll data on educators (referred to as Persal data) to administrative data collected 
on schools including the Annual Survey of Schools data, Snap survey data as well 
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as the EMIS master list of schools. Payroll data of individuals working in the public 
education sector was made available to the author for the months of September 2004, 
October 2008, October 2010 and November 2012.2
Connecting the administrative data sets is a challenging task. EMIS and payroll 
data are managed and collated by two distinct national departments and the different 
data sets were never designed to be used for analyses over time or for linking them 
together. Furthermore, systems for identifying schools are not the same across the 
two data sets. Payroll-school links are made through matching across two codes in 
payroll that point to school establishments. For a more comprehensive discussion 
of the matching process the reader is referred to Wills (2015b). For the total school 
sample, the number of successful matches is identified in Table 1. The number of 
ordinary public schools for each year is identified in the EMIS master list followed by 
the number of schools that are matched to at least one principal in payroll. In some 
schools there may be more than one principal identified in payroll but the analysis that 
follows is concerned with the main school leader. A small number of principals that 
could not be distinguished as the clear institutional leader in a school using the payroll 
post level rankings or salary indicators are excluded from the analysis. For each year, 
between 79% and 89% of ordinary public schools in EMIS are matched to principals, 
with the number of successful matches increasing in recent years.
Table 1: Matching Persal and EMIS
2004 2008 2010 2012
Number of ordinary schools 25 847 25 014 24 761 24 502
School matched to at least one principal 20 531 22 296 22 148 21 939
% of schools matched to at least one principal 79.4 89.1 89.4 89.5
School matched to a ‘senior’ principal 20 359 22 260 22 120 21 808
% of schools matched to ‘senior’ principal 78.8 89.0 89.3 89.0
Source: EMIS and Persal. Notes: Schools are identified as public ordinary schools if 
they are primary, intermediate, combined or secondary schools. Educators 
in the Persal data are identified as principals if their rank title specifies that 
they are a principal. Where there are two or more principals in a school, 
only the clear institutional leader or referred to here as the ‘senior’ principal 
- identified as having highest post level among principals in a school or the 
highest salary - is retained in the sample. The reader is referred Wills (2015c) 
for a fuller treatment of the matching process.
2 Access to Persal data was obtained through the Department of Basic Education in order to assess the 
degree to which different datasets could be merged with a view to monitoring the movement of staff 
across schools over time. Assistance from Martin Gustafsson at the Department of Basic Education in 
understanding the data is acknowledged. Snap data has recently been made publically available to 
researchers through the DataFirst Portal. Access to other non-public datasets was obtained through 
participation in a research project conducted for The Presidency and titled ‘Programme to Support 
Pro-poor Policy Development’ (PSPPD).
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Four characteristics of South Africa’s cohort of principals are identified using the 
data which are relevant to the policy discussion on adopting more effective 
mechanisms for appointing principals, managing their pay and performance 
(Wills 2015a). 
Characteristic one: An aging profile of school principals
Internationally, teachers and principals are getting older and South Africa is no 
exception in this regard (Pont, Nusche & Moorman 2008). The average age of principals 
in 2004 was forty-eight years. In 2012 this average had increased to fifty-one years, 
closely approaching the average age at fifty-three years for principals in Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (OECD 2014). Figure 
1 compares the age distribution of principals in 2012 to that in 2004. Whereas 17% of 
school principals were aged fifty-five or older in 2004, two thirds were this age by 2012. 
In absolute terms, if almost a third of principals were fifty-five years or older in 2012, 
and we assume that they are likely to retire at age sixty,3 as many as 7 000 outgoing 
principals may have to be replaced between 2012 and 2017. As a yearly average, this 
equates to about 1 100 to 1 200 principal replacements for retirement per year over 
this period, compared to a yearly average of about 350 to 500 principals required 
to replace retiring principals between 2004 and 2008. Proportionally more principal 
replacements will need to take place in wealthier schools given the differences in 
the age profile of principals across schools. In 2012, nearly a half of Quintile 5 schools 
had incumbent principals aged fifty-five years or older as opposed to 27% of Quintile 
1 schools as identified in Figure 2. The demand for new principal replacements is 
considerably higher in poorer schools simply because there are more poor schools. 
Despite use of the term ‘quintile’ in the ranking of school wealth by the DBE, there is 
an unequal share of schools represented in lower quintiles.
3 Mandatory retirement age for educators in South Africa is 65 years. However, where pensions are 
accessible at earlier ages the majority of teachers retire well before 65 years. 
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Figure 1: Age distribution of South African school principals in 2004 and 2012
Source: Persal-EMIS matched dataset. Notes: Calculations are based on a sample of 
principals in Persal that could be matched to a school and are identified as the clear 
institutional leader of the school. See Table 1.
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Figure 2: Incumbent school principals in 2012 aged 55 years or older by school quintile
Source: Persal-EMIS matched dataset, own calculations. Notes: See Figure 1.
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The public education system is clearly facing a substantial number of principal 
retirements. Finding suitable replacements and managing leadership transitions 
poses a notable challenge for schools and provincial administrations. An additional 
complication in finding suitable principal replacements relates to the uneven age 
profile of teachers. In the recently released report on teacher demand and supply by 
the Centre for Development and Enterprise, the uneven spread in the age profile of 
teachers is apparent which has implications for the future supply of school leaders. The 
report provides an estimated teacher age profile in 2025 on the basis of the 2013 age 
profile of educators in South Africa, attrition rates and patterns of teacher retirement 
(CDE 2015). The report notes that there is a dip in the current teacher population at 
around thirty to thirty-four years who will move through the system. By 2025, the 
smallest number of teachers will be forty to forty-four years old, which is
[…] the age at which teachers typically have sufficient experience to be eligible 
for senior management positions, such as principal, deputy-principal and HoD. 
The very small pool from which they can be drawn means that less experienced 
teachers may have to be promoted to those positions.
CDE 2015:18
This statement, however, is based on the premise that experience is a valid 
indicator of principal quality and should guide the selection process. 
The retirement of principals poses challenges for education planners (Wills 2015c) 
but it also provides an opportunity to raise the calibre of school leadership through 
the right appointments. As explained in a report on improving school leadership in 
OECD countries,
[t]he imminent retirement of the majority of principals brings both challenges 
and new opportunities for OECD education systems. While it means a major loss of 
experience, it also provides an unprecedented opportunity to recruit and develop 
a new generation of school leaders with the knowledge, skills and disposition best 
suited to meet the current and future needs of education systems.
Pont, Nusche & Moorman 2008:29
Characteristic two: The unequal distribution of principals 
across schools in terms of qualifications and experience
A defining feature of South Africa’s labour market for principals is that they are 
unequally distributed across schools with less qualified and less experienced principals 
typically represented in poorer schools (Figure 3). 
In the education payroll data, qualifications of educators are identified using the 
Relative Educational Qualifications Value (REQV) system. This is a value ranking on 
a scale of ten to seventeen, where the determination of the REQV ranking is based 
primarily on the number of recognised full-time professional or academic years of 
study at an approved university, technikon or college of education, while taking into 
account the level of school education attained (RSA DoE 2003). Higher rankings are 
assigned to more advanced qualifications with implications for promotions, the status 
of contracts and salary levels. A REQV level ten, for example, is associated with having 
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at most a Grade 12 academic qualification and no teachers’ qualification. A REQV level 
seventeen is equivalent to having Grade 12 plus seven years relevant training which 
includes at least a recognised master’s degree. The minimum requirement for entry 
into a permanent teaching post is REQV level thirteen – a Grade 12 qualification plus 
three years of relevant training which is typically a three year teaching diploma.4 In 
the figures presented, the quintile ranking of schools provided by the DBE is used 
as an imperfect measure of wealth status as no background data on schools or their 
students was available in the administrative data used. Identified as the poorest, 
Quintile 1 to 3 schools are non-fee paying while Quintile 4 and 5 schools receive much 
smaller state funding allocations but are left to determine the amount of school fees 
charged in consultation with parents.
In 2012, roughly 34% of principals matched to schools had REQV level fourteen 
signalling a four year bachelors’ degree, 29% had REQV level fifteen and 21% were very 
well-qualified with REQV level sixteen or seventeen, equivalent to a post-graduate 
degree. A further 16% of schools had principals with a qualification ranking equivalent 
to an entry level requirement for a permanent teaching post (REQV level thirteen). 
The poorest schools are significantly less likely to have well-qualified principals than 
wealthier schools. For example, 38% of Quintile 5 schools have very well-qualified 
principals compared with only 14% of Quintile 1 schools.
In part, this unequal distribution is attributable to historically imposed policies that 
matched teachers and principals to schools along racial lines. During apartheid, the race 
of teachers and school leaders would have been matched to the race of the students 
in their schools with separate education departments formed to administer these 
segregated schools. Moreover, policies also favoured the educational advancement 
of the white race group over others, which meant that white educators would have 
been exposed to more training and academic opportunities than educators of other 
races. Although racial controls on schooling were lifted in 1994, there have been 
inertial influences of these state imposed controls on the patterns by which teachers 
and principals are positioned (otherwise referred to as ‘sorted’) across schools. This 
pattern is particularly strong in the case of principals given that the average principal 
in 2012 entered the education system twenty-five years previously, seven years before 
democratic freedom. Due to the fact that race had historically been tied to wealth and 
privilege, it is expected that less qualified principals are overrepresented in the poorer 
parts of the schooling system.
While inequalities in the qualifications of principals across school types may have 
been attributed to historically imposed policies, in the absence of apartheid controls 
on principal sorting, newly appointed principals in poorer schools continue to have 
substantially lower qualifications than those appointed in wealthier schools. This is 
4 The Personnel Administrative Measures identify the minimum qualification criteria for a permanent 
entry level teacher appointment as REQV level thirteen (RSA DoE 2003). In practice, however, 
this has increased to REQV fourteen where teachers should possess a four-year bachelor degree 
in teaching or a three-year degree in another subject area and one additional year specialising 
in education.
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shown in Figure 4 which presents the qualifications by school quintiles of principals 
newly appointed during the period 2008 to 2012 (incoming) and those of principals 
exiting the system (outgoing) over the same period. A second feature of the figure is 
that, with the exception of Quintile 5 schools, newly appointed principals have fewer 
qualifications than outgoing principals. Wealthier schools have historically had more 
qualified principals and continue to appoint increasingly better qualified candidates in 
comparison to poorer schools.
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Figure 3: Principal qualifications (REQV), 2012
Source: Persal-EMIS matched dataset, own calculations. Notes: Not shown in the figure 
are almost negligible percentages of principals in each quintile that have a REQV level 
less than thirteen (i.e. under-qualified). Specifically 0.24% (18) of principals in Quintile 1 
schools, 0.09% (5) of principals in Quintile 2 and 0.04% (2) of principals in Quintile 3 
schools have a REQV level less than thirteen (i.e. under-qualified).  Percentages add up 
to 100 % in each sub-group.
Gabrielle Wills – Informing principal policy reforms in South Africa 
107
REQV 10-12
REQV 13
REQV 14
REQV 15
REQV 16-17
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
All schools Quintile 1
O
ut
go
in
g
O
ut
go
in
g
O
ut
go
in
g
O
ut
go
in
g
O
ut
go
in
g
O
ut
go
in
g
In
co
m
in
g
In
co
m
in
g
In
co
m
in
g
In
co
m
in
g
In
co
m
in
g
In
co
m
in
g
Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
Figure 4: Qualifications (REQV) of outgoing and newly appointed principals
Source: Persal-EMIS matched dataset. Notes: Outgoing principals are principals 
(identified as the clear institutional leader) who leave the public education system 
either between 2008 and 2010 or between 2010 and 2012. Incoming principals are 
principals newly appointed in either 2010 or 2012 that were not identified as principals 
in Persal in previous periods. The graph shows the percentage of principals in each 
sub-group of schools who have a specific REQV level. Percentages add up to 100 % in 
each sub-group.
The observed differences in appointment across poorer and wealthier schools 
are mirrored in the years of service of newly appointed principals. The only available 
measure of experience is ‘years of service’. This is not the same as total work 
experience in the education sector as individuals may have moved in and out of the 
public education sector. Nevertheless, it provides a close proxy for total experience in 
the teaching profession. The typical educator in South Africa has roughly twenty years 
of service before accessing a principal position for the first time, as shown in Figure 
5. On average they will serve ten years in a principal post before exiting the system. 
In the poorest (Quintile 1) schools, however, principal positions can on average 
be reached three years earlier compared with positions in Quintile 4 and 5 schools. 
Access to principal promotion posts in poorer schools is therefore possible with lower 
qualifications and fewer years of experience. This finding holds even when controlling 
for compositional differences (including primary and secondary level, school size and 
teacher numbers) across schools.
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Figure 5: Average years of service of outgoing, newly appointed and all incumbent 
principal
Source: Persal-EMIS matched dataset. Notes: Incumbent principals are those who 
were identified as the main school leader in 2012. Outgoing principals are those 
principals who leave the public education system either between 2008 and 2010 or 
between 2010 and 2012. Incoming principals are those principals newly appointed in 
either 2010 or 2012 that were not identified as principals in Persal in previous periods. 
Total years as a principal is implied through differencing the years of service of newly 
appointed (incoming) principals from that of outgoing principals. Years of service 
in public education are not necessarily equivalent to total years of experience in 
teaching/school leadership if principals had worked outside of the public education 
sector. However it is likely to provide a very close proxy.
In designing policies to address this inequity, it is necessary to distinguish between 
two factors underlying principal sorting. Firstly, sorting is likely to be driven by the 
preferences of individuals for posts in wealthier schools. There may simply be a larger 
pool of good candidates available for posts in wealthier schools, particularly where 
teachers are more qualified in these schools. Secondly, there may be variations in the 
recruitment and selection processes across schools where wealthier schools impose 
more stringent appointment criteria and/or are more likely to follow due process. 
More research is required to disentangle how much each factor weighs on the patterns 
observed; however, policies would need to be targeted at both factors to improve the 
initial matching of principals to schools.
Inequities in the observed credentials of principals across different parts of the 
schooling system point to resourcing inequities and are clearly important to track 
given the historical legacy of apartheid policies. Moreover, if qualifications and 
experience are indicators of principal quality, the sorting patterns noted above pose 
concerns about the capacity of school leaders in the underperforming part of the 
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school system to execute their roles and responsibilities. The question as to whether 
traditional credentials actually signal principal quality in South Africa is considered in 
the discussion that follows. 
Characteristic three: Traditional credentials do not signal 
principal quality
Internationally, credentials such as qualifications and experience are usually the 
key criteria used in the recruitment of teachers and principals and in determining 
their pay. South Africa is no exception in this regard. However, international studies 
provide mixed evidence that credentials have any bearing on actually raising student 
performance in schools (Ballou & Podgursky 1995; Clark, Martorell & Rockoff 2009; 
Eberts & Stone 1988). This is consistent with the evidence on whether teacher 
credentials provide an explanation for differences in student performance across 
schools (Clotfelter, Ladd & Vigdor 2010; Hanushek 2007). For example, in America both 
Eberts and Stone (1988) and Ballou and Podgursky (1995) found a negative correlation 
between school performance and principal education, as measured by advanced 
degrees and graduate training. Using a methodology that allows them to obtain more 
reliable estimates of how principal characteristics impact on student test scores than 
prior studies, Clark et al (2009) found little evidence of any relationship between school 
performance and principal education or pre-principal work experience. However, 
they did find a positive relationship between experience in a principal role and school 
performance as measured by mathematics test scores and student absenteeism.
Identifying whether observed credentials are a signal of quality has implications 
not only for designing effective selection processes, but it also has direct fiscal 
implications. Across the board, the qualifications of principals in South Africa have been 
rising. In just four years, between 2008 and 2012, about 3% more schools had principals 
with REQV level sixteen to seventeen, roughly equivalent to a post-graduate degree. 
However, in the majority of schools the rise in qualifications of principals is not due to 
the appointment of more qualified replacement principals compared with outgoing 
principals. Rather, incumbent principals are acquiring higher level qualifications while 
on the job through in-service training. This was evident in Figure 4 which compared the 
qualifications of newly appointed principals and those of principals exiting the system 
during the period 2008 to 2012. A similar pattern is observed with respect to teachers 
in general in South Africa who build up their qualifications on the job, often over many 
years (CDE 2015). While some may consider this a positive indicator of professional 
development and a signal of leadership quality improvements, the acquisition of 
higher level qualifications is not necessarily a route to improve skills but a way to 
advance along the salary schedule. Unless qualifications improve the proficiencies of 
school leaders this is unlikely to translate into improvements for the core outcome 
of concern, student learning. Instead, the system is at risk if principals access higher 
salaries with higher qualifications but fail to match their increased cost with added 
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value, for example through engaging in positive behavioural change, increased 
responsibilities or raising their performance.
In a working paper by the author that the present discussion draws from (Wills 
2015a), an attempt is made to determine whether principal credentials, as measured by 
REQV levels and years of service, have an effect on school performance in South Africa. 
It is important to highlight that there are various challenges associated with estimating 
reliably how principal credentials are related to school performance. Different types of 
principals are attracted to different types of schools. Moreover, certain principals may 
attract or be attracted to different types of students. By exploiting the longitudinal 
nature of the panel dataset constructed for the study, an attempt was made to control 
some of these patterns of sorting to schools that may bias estimates of how principal 
characteristics affect school performance. A subset of the matched payroll-EMIS data 
set was used for the estimation, limiting the sample to schools that offered Grade 12 
in 2008, 2010 and 2012 and could be connected to school matriculation examination 
outcomes in these years. The author drew on a school level examination series dataset 
constructed by Martin Gustafsson in modelling the impact of South Africa’s 2005 
provincial boundary changes on school performance (Gustafsson & Taylor 2013).
The results showed that in the majority of schools (Quintiles 1 to 3) principal 
credentials, as measured through REQV levels and years of service5, appear to have 
little observable impact on matriculation outcomes, specifically schools’ percentage 
pass rate in the National Senior Certificate examination and the average mathematics 
score out of one hundred obtained by Grade 12 learners who take Mathematics. The 
results do not imply that school principals do not matter for school performance, but 
rather that the value they bring to schools is not signalled through their observed 
credentials as captured in the education payroll data. Due to the potential concern that 
REQV levels are not good measures of qualifications (Welch 2009), one is cautioned in 
implying that the educational qualifications of principals are not important for their 
performance. What is clear, however, is that the REQV level system is not an effective 
signal of principal quality in the majority of schools. While this estimation is still subject 
to some limitations, this is an important finding with implications for the design of 
recruitment policies and pay schedules.
Characteristic four: Low levels of mobility and high tenure
The fourth feature of South Africa’s labour market for principals is low levels of turnover. 
Although this has started to change in recent years, principal turnover rates, which 
include both attrition and mobility related movements, have historically been low. The 
average rate of turnover among principals ranged between 5% – 8% between 2004 and 
2012, as reflected in Table 2. These turnover rates are not dissimilar to those observed 
5 It is entirely possible that years of service as a principal specifically, may provide a more useful 
indicator of a principal’s capacity to execute his or her leadership function – principal experience 
may matter more than just teaching experience. But it was not possible to distinguish between 
years in a principal post from overall teaching experience in the public education sector with the 
data available. This is a limitation of the analysis. 
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among teachers in general6; but compared to employee turnover benchmarks in the 
local public sector and internationally they are comparatively low. For example, using 
twelve months of public sector payroll data over a one year period, Pillay, De Beer and 
Duffy (2012) calculated annual employee turnover rates across thirty-three South African 
public sector departments that range between 9% – 32%. As an international benchmark, 
about 20% – 30% of public school principals leave their positions each year in the United 
States (Beteille, Kalogrides & Loeb 2012; Miller 2013:71).
Table 2: Turnover rates for principals and other educators
Principals Other Educators^
Turnover 
over the 
period (%)
Average yearly 
turnover rates 
(lower bound) 
over the period 
(%)
Turnover over 
the period (%)
Average yearly 
turnover rates 
(lower bound) over 
the period (%)
2004-2008 23.4 5.8 - -
2008-2012 28.7 7.2 - -
2008-2010 13.6 6.8 16.1 8.1
2010-2012 16.6 8.3 16.7 8.3
Source: Persal-EMIS matched data Notes: Using principals as the unit of analysis, 
a principal is identified as transitioning by determining whether the school at which 
they held a principal post in the first period was different to their position in the 
second period. Therefore the calculation considers both mobility and attrition related 
turnover. The turnover rate is calculated by dividing the number of principals who 
transition as a proportion of all identified principals in the first period. Excluded from 
the denominator and numerator are principals who were identified in the payroll data 
in the second period but could not be matched to a school. This prevents ratios being 
inflated due to data matching problems. It is noted that yearly rates are arguably 
lower bound estimates as some principals may have moved more than once in each 
period. ^Other educators include teachers, departmental heads and deputy principals 
who can be matched to an ordinary school in EMIS data. 
A key reason for low levels of principal turnover is that principal moves within 
the system are uncommon. Instead, the majority of the turnover is accounted for by 
6 Martin Gustafsson’s report produced for the Department of Basic Education in 2009 entitled 
‘Teacher supply patterns in the payroll data’, identifies six % year-on-year attrition for educators 
in South Africa. However he finds that attrition is halved if you exclude ‘churners’ being those 
that exit then return to public education. It is important to note that depending on the definition 
of attrition used and the data years considered in calculations, rates of attrition may vary 
considerably. Multiple years of data are required to fully account for multiple entries and exits 
of individuals (Gustafson 2009). The turnover rates that have been calculated in this paper for 
principals and other educators only calculate turnover between two points of data. Churning may 
occur between these data points.
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attrition (i.e. moves out of the public education system). Between 2004 and 2008 
attrition accounted for two-thirds of principal turnover. This rose to three-quarters 
between 2008 and 2012 due to rising retirement-related turnover. With little churning 
across schools, principal tenure among incumbent school principals closely follows their 
total years of principal experience. In the Verification-ANA 2013 questionnaire presented 
to roughly 2 000 school principals from a nationally representative sample of schools, 
principals were asked about their years of principal experience and tenure as a principal 
at their current school. The median years of total principal experience was nine years, 
only one year more than the median total years served in their current school.
An added feature of the low levels of mobility in the sector is that over half of 
newly appointed principals (55%) are promoted from within the same school. Table 3 
identifies the position of principals in the data two years before they are identified 
as newly appointed principals. As expected a large proportion of newly appointed 
principals (41%) are promoted from deputy principal positions, and a third from head of 
department positions. Surprisingly, as many as 23% of newly appointed principals were 
only in a teaching post two years prior to their appointment as principal.
Table 3: Positions from which newly appointed principals are promoted
Percentage
Position two years prior to appointment
Deputy principal 40.8
Head of department 34.2
Teacher 23.0
FET/ABET lecturer 0.1
Administration post 1.0
Not in the public education system 1.0
Total 100
Position two years prior to appointment
Promoted from within the same school 55.3
Promoted from a different institution 44.7
Total 100
Source: Persal-EMIS matched dataset (2008, 2010 and 2012). Notes: Calculations are 
for 5 262 newly appointed (incoming) principals who are identified in either 2010 or 
2012 as principals but were not identified as principals in Persal in previous periods 
(2008 and/or 2004). 
There are likely to be various reasons for low levels of principal mobility, such as 
low relocation benefits, language and cultural factors or nepotistic appointment 
arrangements. International literature also indicates that low mobility may be 
strongly related to a lack of accountability measures affecting principals. When hard-
stakes performance management systems are in place with principal performance 
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evaluations based on school performance, job security concerns incentivise principals 
to move schools. For example Clotfelter et al (2007) found that in North Carolina in 
the USA, there was a sharp increase in rates of principal turnover in response to the 
introduction of the state’s test-based accountability system. To avoid low performance 
ratings, principals are more likely to move from worse to better performing schools, 
which usually involves moving from poorer to wealthier schools (Branch et al 2012; 
Gates, Ringel, Santibanez et al 2006; Loeb et al 2010).
Where the current design of performance management systems for principals in 
IQMS  is weakly linked to threats to job security or very favourable monetary rewards, 
it is unlikely to drive mobility related principal moves. Yet evidence suggests that 
there may be other incentives at play that affect mobility patterns. A combination 
of econometric and descriptive evidence using the payroll-EMIS matched dataset 
indicates that principals may view positions in slightly wealthier schools or urban 
schools as more attractive options. This is not surprising if associated working 
conditions in these schools are better than in poorer or rural schools. Furthermore, 
school-to-school transfer patterns suggest that principals seek positions in larger 
schools as opposed to smaller ones. This is not surprising since salaries are linked not 
only to qualifications but to school size.
The race of the principal relative to the race of the student composition of the 
school also appears to influence patterns of transfer in South Africa. In the literature 
from the United States, the likelihood that a principal or teacher leaves a school rises 
as the racial composition of the student body deviates from that of the principal or 
teacher (Gates et al 2006; Hanushek, Kain & Rivkin 2001). In the South African context, 
there is also evidence that the racial composition of students relative to the principal 
is significantly associated with their decision to move. Black principals are more likely 
to move out of a school if there is a non-majority black student enrolment. White 
principals are more likely to move out of a school when the majority race composition 
of the school is black. In this respect, historical patterns of principal sorting to schools 
along racial lines continue to persist through patterns of principal transfers.
In summary, this section has identified that the South African labour market for 
principals is characterised by low levels of mobility. With low numbers of school-to-
school transfers, principal transfers within the system do not pose a substantial 
threat to widening existing inequalities in the distribution of principals across schools. 
However, among those principals who do move within the system there appear to 
be incentives operating in the direction of increasing existing inequalities, specifically 
where race informs transfer decisions.
Discussion: Evidence informing policy
The preceding discussion has highlighted four overarching characteristics of the labour 
market for principals. In summary:
1. The age profile of principals has been rising, indicating the need for a substantial 
number of principal replacements in the near future. While proportionally more 
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retirements are taking place in wealthier schools, the absolute demand for 
principal replacements is highest in the poorest schools. Moreover, the demand for 
replacement principals is particularly large at the primary and intermediate school 
level comprising over 60% of anticipated principal replacements due to retirement.
2. Principals are unequally distributed across schools with less qualified and less 
experienced principals represented in greater proportions in poorer schools. 
Initial matching of new principals to schools continues to persist in line with 
historical patterns.
3. There is some evidence that in the majority of schools principal credentials as 
measured in the educator payroll data, namely REQV levels and years of service, 
have little observable positive relationship with school performance as measured 
by matriculation outcomes. This does not imply that qualifications are not 
important. Rather the value principals bring to schools is not signalled through 
their observed credentials as measured, specifically, in the educator payroll data. 
4. Despite rising levels of retirement related attrition, low levels of mobility and 
consequently high levels of average tenure characterise this market. Although 
the number of within sector transfers is low, there is some evidence that among 
principals who move from school to school, transfer patterns tend to exacerbate 
existing inequalities.
In a sector characterised by low levels of mobility and high levels of tenure, 
policies should be aimed at improving the initial match of principals to schools while 
developing the effectiveness of incumbent principals over their length of tenure. 
Moreover, where observed credentials provide weak signals of quality, policies 
guiding the selection and rewarding of principals should extend beyond qualifications 
and experience to identify expertise and skills that better signify quality.
In light of this, the relevance of proposed policies in the National Development 
Plan (NDP) to improve the calibre of school leadership is considered, and for ease 
of reference summarised in Table 4. The findings strongly support proposals to 
i) introduce competency-based assessment in the appointment process and ii) 
implement performance management for incumbent school principals aimed at 
increasing the quality of leadership provided to schools. However, the design and 
implementation of these policies are important to ensure that they generate the 
desired outcomes and this warrants additional research. In brief, some issues are 
discussed in this regard.
Competency-based testing should be designed to identify competencies that 
distinguish better quality school leaders from weaker ones. Currently little evidence 
exists on the types of skills or attributes that matter for school performance in the 
South African context. What is clear from both local and international literature, 
is the need for principals with a strong instructional focus who lead the activities of 
the school to focus on the core business of teaching and learning (Bush et al 2006; 
Hallinger & Heck 1996). 
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Improving performance management systems for principals, either in the existing 
IQMS or in designing a replacement system, is complex. It involves issues such as 
what performance criteria are monitored, who evaluates performance and how it is 
rewarded. Performance must be assessed in terms of standards for leadership and 
managerial behaviours that are logically linked to learning improvements in schools. 
Alternatively, performance may be directly measured by improvements in student 
learning in the schools principals lead. A clear weakness with the existing IQMS is that, 
although management and leadership evaluation criteria are included, the evaluation 
of a principal’s role is not treated distinctly from his or her role as teacher (Smit 2013). 
IQMS is also not linked to measurable indicators of school performance. Of course, 
identifying suitable learning indicators against which to measure performance is a 
notable challenge in designing a new system. While the Annual National Assessments 
(ANA) provide a very useful mechanism for diagnosing learning deficits (and are an 
important addition to accountability more broadly), in their current form they have 
shortcomings. Progress is needed in ensuring that ANAs become a truly standardised 
test before considering them as measures for tracking learning improvements over 
time, let alone rewarding schools and principals for these improvements. Currently 
ANAs are not designed to be compared over time (John 2012; Taylor 2012). Moreover, 
linking principal performance to student test scores, for example, poses potential 
threats of introducing perverse incentives. For example, principals may move out 
of schools with underperforming students and transfer to more attractive schools. 
This pattern of transfer typically involves moving out of poorer schools, thereby 
aggravating existing inequalities in the distribution of principals and reducing the pool 
of applicants for posts in underperforming schools.
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In implementing performance management systems there are also notable 
challenges. Arranging performance evaluation meetings with principals in more than 
24 000 public schools is likely to pose logistical problems. This was identified as a clear 
challenge in the implementation of the existing IQMS, providing few guarantees that 
direct line managers will conduct evaluations in the future (RSA DBE 2014c; RSA DBE 
2012). Increased accountability for principals goes hand-in-hand with improvements 
at a district level to support and monitor schools (Elmore 2000). Finally, performance 
management is likely to be met with considerable resistance not only from teacher 
unions, but from principals themselves if they feel that the system is unfair or that 
there are too many variables affecting their performance that they feel are outside of 
their control (Heystek 2015). These concerns are expressed in a context where they 
have no control over hiring and firing of those they are appointed to lead. 
Improved performance management systems must be packaged carefully to 
minimise resistance. Proposals are likely to be more palatable where performance 
evaluations are strongly connected to training and mentoring to actively address 
areas of non-performance. More generally, carefully crafted packages of policies are 
necessary to ensure that the individual aims of each are realised. This is particularly 
relevant in reference to the NDP proposal to delegate more authority to school 
leaders. Hanushek and Woesmann (2007), in reviewing evidence on strategies for 
school improvement, noted that providing increased decision-making authority to 
schools has been shown to have significant impacts for improving school outcomes, 
even in developing country contexts. They caution, however, that “Local autonomy 
without strong accountability may be worse than doing nothing” (ibid:74). The 
NDP does suggest that more autonomy be given to school principals conditional 
on exhibiting a level of leadership quality. This indirectly implies that this policy be 
packaged with performance management where a rewarded outcome of assessments 
is increased autonomy.
The NDP proposal to raise minimum principal qualification criteria to having an 
Advanced Certificate in Education (ACE) in School Leadership and Management is 
not strongly supported by the available evidence. Research has previously been 
conducted into evaluating the effectiveness of the ACE programme in raising the 
quality of school leaders (Bush, Duku, Glover et al 2009). While the report makes 
many positive qualitative links between the programme and its ability to raise principal 
competencies, there was no conclusive improvement in the performance of the 
schools led by these ACE trained graduates. It is cautioned that unless the revised ACE 
programme results in improved leadership and management competencies it is unlikely 
to act as a useful indicator of principal quality. It might rather have the unintended 
consequence of reducing the available pool of potential principal candidates to those 
who have obtained this certificate. Already the pool of suitable principals is likely to be 
too small to meet the replacement demand for the substantial number of retirements 
taking place. It is noted that the ACE programme makes useful provisions for forms 
of mentoring and on-site training for school principals in raising leadership quality. In 
light of the evidence presented, the extensive number of principals who are retiring, 
SAJCE– December 2015
118
particularly those from well-functioning schools, provides a pool of available trainers 
and mentors for growing numbers of newly appointed principals.
An additional policy that was not considered in the NDP, and is relevant in light 
of the evidence provided, is introducing monetary incentives to improve the available 
pool of principal candidates applying for posts in hard-to-staff and poor performing 
schools. Directing a pool of good applicants to poorer schools is particularly important 
not only for improving the distribution of principals across schools, but also to meet a 
much larger demand for replacement principals in these schools.
In conclusion, this research has attempted to contribute to an evidence base on 
principals to inform policy to raise the quality of school leadership and management. 
It may take many years before more effective systems for the appointment and 
performance management of principals are finalised and implemented. Nevertheless, 
these are urgent priorities in light of the substantial number of principal replacements 
to be made in schools both currently and in the near future. With each principal 
placement, the leadership trajectory of the average school is established for almost 
a decade. Evidence-based policy making has a strong role to play in getting this right.
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